Consent Decrees and the Judicial Function by Walter, Clark E.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 20 
Issue 2 Winter 1970 Article 7 
1970 
Consent Decrees and the Judicial Function 
Clark E. Walter 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Clark E. Walter, Consent Decrees and the Judicial Function, 20 Cath. U. L. Rev. 312 (1971). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol20/iss2/7 
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
Consent Decrees and the Judicial Function
Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act provides that a final judgment or decree in
government criminal or civil proceeding which finds that a defendant violated
the antitrust laws "shall be prima facie evidence against such defendant in
any action or proceeding brought by any other party . . .under said laws
...as to all matters respecting which said judgment or decree would be an
estoppel as between the parties thereto."'
Prior to the passage of the Clayton Act in 1914, an injured individual could
not use judgments rendered in successful government antitrust suits as evi-
dence of guilt.2 Concern for improving the record of success for injured
plaintiffs was an important force which prompted ultimate passage of the
Act. In a special message to Congress before passage of the Act, President
Woodrow Wilson expressed the hope:
that we shall agree in giving private individuals who claim to
have been injured by these processes the right to found their
suits for redress upon the facts and judgment proved and entered
in suits by Government.
. . . It is not fair that the private litigant should be obliged to set
up and establish again facts which the Government has proved. He
cannot afford, he has not the power, to make use of such processes
of inquiry as the Government has command of. Thus shall indi-
vidual justice be done while the processes of business are recti-
fied and squared with the general conscience. 3
The House version of the bill provided that consent decrees be given the
same evidentiary effect as litigated judgments. 4 In the Senate, however, it
was argued that if such a clause were adopted it would "effectually put an end
to all consent decrees." 5 The Senate view prevailed, and a resulting proviso
in Section 5(a) exempts "consent judgments or decrees entered before any
1. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
2. See Buckeye Powder Co. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Powder Co., 248 U.S. 55,
63 (1918).
3. 51 CONG. REc. 1962-64 (1914).
4. H.R. REP. No. 627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 2 (1914).
5. 51 CONG. REC. 13,901 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins). Defendants
agree to consent decrees not only when they feel that trial would produce the same
result, but also when they feel that the profits gained from the practices in question do
not warrant the expense and publicity of a trial. If a consent decree has the same
effect (in subjecting the defendant to private suits) as a litigated judgment, the latter
factor does not have as much weight in the decision.
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testimony has been taken"6 from the operation of the section.
In an antitrust action where the plaintiff has limited financial and investi-
gative resources, the successful prosecution of his treble damage action may
depend on the availability of a government judgment which serves as prima
facie evidence of the alleged violation. When the government agrees to the
entry of a consent decree before litigation, private plaintiffs lose the
evidentiary benefits of the prima facie provision of Section 5(a). This
makes recovery in individual antitrust actions more difficult, a result which
seems to be inconsistent with the Act's policy of encouraging private enforce-
ment of the antiturst laws. 7 On the other hand, the government should be
free to prosecute and terminate its antitrust cases through the most efficient
use of information and resources in representing the public interest. Any
resolution of the two conflicting policies of Section 5(a)-that of providing
private plaintiffs with prima facie evidence based upon government suits
and that of allowing the government to terminate its cases by consent decrees
which have no evidentiary effect in private suits-requires an examination of
the history and nature of the government's use of the consent decree, and an
analysis of its effect upon private enforcement of the antitrust laws.
Private Enforcement of the Antitrust Laws
The Supreme Court. has long recognized that the private treble damage ac-
tion was intended as more than a mere compensatory measure to redress
individual injuries. In its view, by the enactment of Section 5 (a), "Congress
intended to use private self-interest as a means of enforcement" of the anti-
trust laws in the belief that "private antitrust litigation is one of the surest
weapons for effective enforcement."9
In Cinammon v. Abner A. Wolf, Inc.,10 the court discussed the policy of
the antitrust laws with respect to private treble damage actions:
The purpose of Section 4 of the Clayton Act . . . which provides
for private triple damage suits is "to enlist the 'business public
• . . as allies of the government in enforcing the antitrust laws;'
the means chosen, on the other hand, is to give 'the injured party
ample recompense for the wrong suffered' by allowing threefold
damages." . . . In other words, the private antitrust suit is a
6. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).
7. See, e.g., Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322 (1955).
8. Bruce's Juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947).
9. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. New Jersey Wood Finishing Co., 381 U.S. 311,
318 (1965). In Quemos Theatre Co. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 35 F. Supp. 949 (D.N.J.
1940), the private suit was graphically described as a means of supplying "an ancillary
force of private investigators to supplement the Department of Justice in law enforce-
ment." Id. at 950.
10. 215 F. Supp. 833 (E.D. Mich. 1963).
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substantial weapon in effectuating a national policy of protecting,
preserving, and promoting free competition in the market place
by blending "antitrust policy with private compensatory law.""
Those charged with public enforcement of the antitrust laws are quick to
recognize private actions as a desirable and necessary supplement to govern-
ment enforcement efforts. Robert A. Bicks, former First Assistant to the
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, listed ways by which
treble damage actions contribute to the government's policing functions:
Private actions . . . do more than duplicate government work.
They may adjudicate practices not expressly covered by govern-
ment decrees. Or they may help close the breach left by neces-
sarily incomplete government policing of decrees. And, most im-
portant, private recoveries heighten the financial impact and conse-
quently the deterrent value of both civil and criminal government
actions. In addition, the threat of subsequent private litigation
may well be a major consideration prompting defendants to enter
into consent decrees.12
In a statement delivered before the Senate Select Committee on Small
Business, Leo Loevinger, who was later to take charge of the Antitrust Divi-
sion, speculated that even a quadruple appropriation for the Division would
not equal the enforcement effectiveness of private action."1 He urged Con-
gress to "enact a straight-forward and unequivocal declaration of policy stat-
ing that primary reliance for antitrust enforcement is upon private action."' 4
Since the success of a private treble damage suit frequently depends directly
on the availability of a government judgment as prima facie evidence,"5 a
decision to terminate an action by consent decree necessarily involves the
11. Id. at 834.
12. Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Damage Actions, 4
ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 8 (1959).
13. Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST
BULL. 167-68 (1958).
14. Id. at 172. The present Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust
Division, Richard W. McLaren, has expressed a similar view. In an address before the
Antitrust Committees of the Federal Bar Ass'n and the Philadelphia Bar Ass'n on De-
cember 11, 1969, he stated:
Private antitrust proceedings today are not merely a means of compensating
victims of antitrust conspiracies; they provide a substantial and meaningful
deterrent to violations of the antitrust laws. Indeed, until the Congress acts
on our recommendation to increase the maximum Sherman Act fine for cor-
porations from $50,000 to $500,000, the treble damage action provides the
only meaningful financial deterrent to antitrust violations.
BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 440 at X-15 (Dec. 16, 1969).
15. It has been estimated that nearly 90 percent of all private treble damage suits
have followed the successful conclusion of Government litigated actions. STAFF OF THE
ANTITRUST SUBCOMM. OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 86TH CONG., IST
SESS., REPORT ON THE CONSENT DECREE PROGRAM OF THE DEP'T OF JUSTICE 23, n.73
(Comm. Print 1959) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
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possibility of weakening another important means of antitrust enforcement.
Thus, when the Antitrust Division enters into negotiations with a defendant
concerning a possible settlement, its position is analogous to that of a regu-
latory agency in determining whether a proposed consent decree provides
the most effective means of relief necessary for protection of the public in-
terest.16
History and Nature of the Consent Decree Program
Historically, the disposition of antitrust cases by consent of the parties, rather
than through trial, has been a salient feature of the administration of the anti-
trust laws by the Department of Justice. From its first use in 1906,'17 the con-
sent decree has been used with increasing frequency; since 1955 consent de-
crees have consistently accounted for approximately 70 percent of all termi-
nations of civil actions filed by the Antitrust Division.' 8
The decree itself usually emerges from a series of secret, informal nego-
tiations between lawyers representing the Antitrust Division and counsel for
the defense. These negotiations closely resemble normal business contract
negotiations. The parties are engaged in a bargaining process in which the
government offers to refrain from formal litigation in return for the de-
fendant's consent to enter a "contract" obligating him to institute or refrain
from certain conduct. The resulting "consent decree," when ratified by the
court, carries the sanction of contempt if breached.
Pursuant to congressional recommendation,' 9 the Justice Deartment in July
of 1961 put into effect a policy requiring that all proposed consent decrees
be "filed in court or otherwise made available upon request to interested
persons" at least 30 days prior to entry by the court.20  During this 30 day
period, the Justice Department expressly reserves the right to withdraw or
withhold its consent to the proposed decree whenever the comments, views,
or allegations submitted by non-parties "disclose facts or considerations which
indicate that the proposed judgment is inappropriate, improper or inade-
quate .... -21 At the same time the Department reserves the right to
object to intervention by any person who has not been named as a party
by the government. Generally speaking, government objections to interven-
tion that would defeat the entry of a consent decree have been consistently
16. See Timberg, Recent Developments in Antitrust Consent Judgments, 10 FED.
B.J. 351 (1949).
17. United States v. Otis Elevator Co., 1 Decrees & Judgments in Fed. Antitrust
Cases 107 (9th Cir. 1906).
18. ABA ANITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, 1955-1968 at 226 (1968).
19. REPORT 27.
20. 28 C.F.R. § 50.1(b) (1970).
21. Id.
1970]
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sustained by the courts.22
As a general rule, consent decrees are accepted and signed by the court
as a matter of purely formal routine. If the court, after a brief presentation
by defendant's counsel and the Antitrust Division attorneys, is satisfied that
the parties are in agreement, the requested order is entered with only cursory
examination.2 3 Ordinarily, no record is made of the proceedings. Findings
of fact or conclusions of law are not made, nor are they required. 24 The
Justice Department need not prepare a written statement of facts upon which
the government bases its case, nor declare what it expects to accomplish
through the decree. Similarly, the court is not required to render a written
opinion. This is so notwithstanding the fact that: (1) the final order is
treated as a final judgment; (2) the terms of the consent decree may be-
come the standard for an entire industry; and (3) traditional competitors
of the defendant are denied the right to intervene and object to the entry of
the decree and therefore may be adversely affected in their business opera-
tions.
The Automobile Manufacturers A nti-Pollution Consent Decree
On September 11, 1969, the Department of Justice filed a proposed consent
decree prohibiting the major automobile manufacturers and their trade asso-
ciation from conspiring to delay and obstruct the development and installa-
tion of pollution control devices for motor vehicles. The events which gave
rise to this decision and which resulted in the ultimate approval of the decree
by the court on October 28, 1969, highlight both the advantages and dis-
advantages of the government's consent decree program.
In mid-1966, a federal grand jury commenced investigation of the practices
of the automotive industry regarding possible anti-competitive practices in the
failure to develop automotive anti-pollution devices. After 18 months of
grand jury proceedings the Antitrust Division's trial attorney wanted to ask the
grand jury for an indictment. The Division, however, dropped the crimi-
nal case and had the grand jury discharged without public explanation. One
22. United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 272 F. Supp. 432 (C.D. Cal. 1967),
ajf'd sub nom., Thrifty Shoppers Scrip Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968).
Traditionally, such intervention has not been permitted either as of right under FED.
R. Civ. P. 24(a), or in the discretion of the court under Rule 24(b). The most fre-
quent rationale employed by the court is that intervention would interfere with the
Justice Department's control of its action, and consequently the government's representa-
tion of the public interest. United States v. A.S.C.A.P., 11 F.R.D. 511, 513
(S.D.N.Y. 1951).
23. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS, 1955-1968, at 229
(1968).
24. United States v. Institute of Carpet Mfrs. of Am., 1940-43 TRADE CAS.,
56,097 (S.D.N.Y. 1941).
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year later, on January 10, 1969, the United States filed a civil complaint
charging that General Motors Corporation, Ford Motor Company, Chrysler
Corporation, American Motors Corporation, and the Automobile Manufac-
turers Association had violated Section 1 of the Sherman Act by conspiring
to eliminate competition in the research, development, manufacture, and
installation of automotive air pollution control equipment, and in the purchase
of patents and patent rights covering such equipment. 25
The defendants did not answer the complaint. Instead, following the entry
of several stipulations extending their time for answer, the parties filed a stip-
ulation for entry of a consent judgment terminating the litigation. On its own
motion, the district court ordered a hearing and invited all interested persons
to express their views on the proposed consent decree. Pursuant to this in-
vitation, 16 objections to or requests for modification of the proposed judg-
ment and 13 applications for intervention were filed by interested associa-
tions and individuals. 26
At the hearing, the court heard arguments from proponents and opponents
of the decree, but neither the government nor the defendants introduced
evidence. They called no witnesses. The did not summarize their substan-
tive contentions nor did they advise the court what facts supported their
respective positions. Nevertheless, at the conclusion of oral argument, the
court denied all applications for intervention and approved the consent de-
cree as submitted by the parties:
The decision to settle an antitrust case [by consent decree] like the
decision to commence it in the first place, is an administrative deci-
sion and is a part of the implementation of the general policy of the
Executive branch of government. As such, it is not subject to re-
view by this court.
This court does have the power to disapprove the proposed settle-
ment, but its use requires the exercise of discretion, based upon
legal, as distinguished from administrative considerations. For in-
stance, the court should withhold its approval if the decree be unen-
forceable or if it should provide for relief not consistent with the
prayer of the complaint. The court may properly consider whether
or not the rights of the persons not parties to the action are jeop-
ardized and whether the consent decree, on the whole, is against the
public interest.17
One aspect of the consent decree program which requires examination is
the role of courts in deciding whether a proposed decree is in the "public in-
25. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, Civil No. 69-75 (C.D. Cal., filed
Jan. 10, 1969).
26. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969),
ajf'd per curiam sub nom. City of New York v. United States, 397 U.S. 248 (1970).
27. 307 F. Supp. at 620-21.
19701
Catholic University Law Review
terest." In the Automotive case, the court concluded that the anti-pollution
consent decree was in the public interest, on the basis of a record consisting
solely of the government's complaint and the proposed decree. The fact
that the decree paralleled the complaint apparently sufficed to settle this
issue.28
To hold that a consent decree is necessarily in the public interest whenever
it contains all the relief specifically requested in the government's com-
plaint can be justified on one of two grounds. Either a defendant has a
"right" to such a decree, or the court to which it is submitted for approval is
without power to question the government's decision not to press for further
relief.
The "Right" to a Consent Decree
Litigation concerning the right to a consent decree normally involves attempts
by antitrust defendants to force entry of decrees over the opposition of the
government in cases where the decree allegedly includes all the relief requested
in the complaint. The early case of United States v. Hartford-Empire
Co.,19 appeared to rule out the notion of a consent decree without consent,
pointing out that a consent decree involves an agreement between the
contending parties in a case. The court therefore held that since the govern-
ment had not consented to the proposed decrees, they could not properly be
termed "consent decrees." This view is in accord with the traditional con-
cept of a consent decree-a court order based upon the mutual understanding
of the parties.30
The emergence of the so-called "asphalt clause" in antitrust terminology
has occasioned some disagreement on this point, however. First inserted in
consent decrees entered against ten sellers of asphalt, road tar, and bitumi-
nous concrete, 31 this provision purported to enjoin the defendants from deny-
ing the prima facie effect of the decree in the pending treble damage actions
filed by certain state and local agencies.
Controversy over such an "asphalt clause" in United States v. Brunswick-
Balke-Collender Co. 3 2 resulted in a shift away from the Hartford-Empire
"mutual understanding" reasoning and introduced the somewhat contradic-
tory concept of a unilateral consent decree. The complaint in Brunswick
charged the defendants with combining and conspiring to restrain and monopo-
28. Id. at 621.
29. 1 F.R.D, 424 (N.D. Ohio 1940).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Swift Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932).
31. United States v. Allied Chem. Corp., 1961 TRADE CAS. 69,923 (D. Mass.
1960); United States v. Lake Asphalt & Petroleum Co., 1960 TRADE CAS. 69,835 (D.
Mass. 1960).
32. 203 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Wis. 1962).
[Vol. 20:312
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lize interstate trade and commerce in folding gymnasium bleachers. After
negotiations with the government had appeared to result in agreement upon
a satisfactory consent decree, defendants were advised that the Justice De-
partment's new policy required the inclusion in the decree of an "asphalt
clause" which would permit the decree to be used as prima facie evidence of
guilt in future private treble damage suits. The defendants objected to the
proposed clause and moved for entry of judgment against themselves in the
form proposed by the government except for the objected-to provision.
The court approved the decree without the "asphalt clause" characterizing
the government's apparent policy of seeking to advance the cause of private
litigants as an "unauthorized attempt on the part of an administrative agency
to avoid Congressional intent as clearly set forth in the proviso in § 5 of the
Clayton Act."'3 3  That proviso, said the court, gave the defendants "an un-
qualified right"34 to avoid a judgment with prima facie effect. By withhold-
ing its consent, the Department of Justice was "not only arbitrarily denying
the moving defendants this right but frustrating the clear intent of Congress
to encourage early entries of injunctional decrees without long and protracted
trials."35
The view that the congressional policy in the proviso to Section 5 gives a
defendant a right to capitulate is supported by neither the language nor
the legislative history of Section 5. Rather than conferring rights upon anti-
trust defendants, Section 5 was intended to benefit third parties injured by an
antitrust violation,3 6 as well as to provide a stimulus to defendants to settle for
the benefit of efficient government enforcement. 37  Instead of being con-
trary to the congressional purpose for enacting Section 5, the government's at-
tempted means of settlement in the Brunswick case seems to be a useful device
for carrying out the two major congressional purposes behind Section 5-to
assist injured third parties and to obtain efficient government enforcement by
consent decrees.
The Supreme Court has not adopted such an approach toward consent de-
cree rights. In United States v. Ward Baking Co.,38 the Court held that a dis-
trict court should not have concluded, at least without an "opportunity
to know the record,"'39 that the government was not entitled to demand the
33. Id. at 661.
34. Id. at 662.
35. Id.
36. 51 CONG. REC. 13851 (1914) (remarks of Senator Walsh); id. at 15825 (re-
marks of Senator Reed); id. at 16,046 (remarks of Senator Norris).
37. 51 CONG. REc. 15824 (1914) (remarks of Senator Lewis); id. at 16276 (re-
marks of Senator Webb); id. at 16,004 (remarks of Senator Chilton).
38. 376 U.S. 327 (1964).
39. Id. at 333.
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inclusion of additional relief in a consent decree not specifically requested in
its complaint. The district court had been of the opinion that the decree pro-
vided all the relief to which the government would be entitled if a decree had
been entered after trial, and approved the proposed consent decree. 40  In
reversing and remanding for trial, the Supreme Court held that "where the
Government seeks an item of relief to which evidence adduced at trial may
show that it is entitled, ' '41 the trial court may not enter a consent decree
without the government's consent. Implicit in Ward Baking, therefore, is the
notion that the Attorney General has the discretionary power to force a trial
where the government insists upon injunctive relief which is unacceptable to
the defendant. If, in this manner, the Attorney General can force a trial
which will result in a Section 5 judgment, there would seem to be little reason
why the "asphalt clause" should not be used to provide the same effect in ap-
propriate situations.
In a public statement discussing the policy of the Antitrust Division con-
cerning the inclusion of "asphalt clauses" similar to those involved in the
Brunswick case, Assistant Attorney General McLaren argued from the premise
that antitrust defendants have no right to a decree which otherwise contains
the full relief requested in a government complaint:
I would not expect to see an 'asphalt clause' contained in any
great number of consent decrees in the future. However, in situa-
tions where the Division has determined to oppose the entry of
nolo pleas in order to aid private litigants, but where the court
nevertheless accepts the nolo pleas, it would seem to follow that in
any companion civil case the Division should consider going to
trial if the defendants will not agree to the inclusion of an 'asphalt
clause' in the decree. In making this determination, we would con-
sider whether the strength of the Division's civil case is such that
there is a substantial chance to obtain a favorable judgment. 42
The Judicial Function
Assuming that an antitrust defendant can not insist upon a consent decree,
should a district court make an independent judicial determination that such
a decree is in the public interest? A court should give weight to the Attorney
General's determination that the decree is in the public interest, and should
likewise recognize that the settlement of antitrust litigation is encouraged by
the congressional policy reflected in the Section 5(a) proviso. The public is
40. United States v. Ward Baking Co., 1963 TRADE CAS. 70,609 (M.D. Fla. 1962).
41. 376 U.S. at 334 (emphasis added).
42. Remarks of Richard W. McLaren before the Antitrust Committees of the Fed-
eral Bar Ass'n and the Philadelphia Bar Ass'n, Dec. 11, 1969, in BNA ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG, REP. No, 440 at X-15, 17.
[Vol. 20:312
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entitled to have the final judicial determination made upon a record suffi-
ciently complete to permit an informed adjudication of the issue.
A major failing of the present practice of measuring the public interest
standard of a consent decree by its similarity to the items of relief requested in
the government's complaint is highlighted by the Antitrust Division's fre-
quently used procedure of conducting pre-complaint negotiations with pro-
spective antitrust defendants. This is a procedure whereby a consent decree
is negotiated prior to the time the government complaint is filed. The
technique is not new to the Antitrust Division, having been used in approxi-
mately one-fourth of all antitrust cases disposed of during the 1920's.43 The
pre-negotiation was largely disregarded during the 1930's and was used
only sparingly during the period between 1939-1942, 44 but since 1954 it has
been used with increased frequency in settling antitrust litigation. 45
An outline of the procedure and its advantages was set forth by a former
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division:
Under our policy, in some cases which appear to us to be adapted to
its use, the Division after it has investigated a particular situation
and prepared a proposed complaint, notifies the prospective de-
fendants of the intention of filing a civil complaint against them.
In general terms, we outline to the proposed defendants the nature
and the grounds of our charges. If the prospective defendants care
to start negotiations towards a possible decree in advance of the
filing of our complaint, we are ready to meet them at the con-
ference table ....
. . . Pre-filing negotiation permits quick discussion and settlement
of the economic and legal issues of the case without the rigidity
and the publicity of an already filed complaint. 46
Whenever the pre-filing negotiations result in the satisfactory agreement of
both parties, the complaint and proposed decree are filed at the same time.
This method of handling antitrust cases has met with severe criticism. In
his dissent to the 1955 Report of the Attorney General's National Committee
to Study the Antitrust Laws, Professor Louis B. Schwartz stated:
The report recommends that the Department of Justice enter into
negotiations with prospective defendants for consent decrees. Such
a practice will certainly have the advantage claimed for it in the
majority report, namely, 'increased cooperation between business
and Government,' saving time and money. What it will also do is
43. Hearings on the Consent Decree Program of the Dep't of Justice Before the
Antitrust Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., ser. 9,
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whittle away the last remnants of judicial control and public scru-
tiny in this area, and involve the Government in bargaining with a
law violator not only as to the relief but also as to the nature of the
accusation to be made against him. The proposal opens the possi-
bility that the Government's complaint will be modified so as to be
consistent with the relief that defendant is prepared to consent to.
But the settlement of an antitrust case ought not to be a simple mat-
ter of bargaining between the Department and the defendant. 47
Regardless of the merit of the government's negotiating with alleged law
violators, the court should recognize that protection of the public interest is
slim indeed when a judge does nothing more than compare the complaint
and the proposed consent decree which were negotiated in secret and filed
simultaneously.
Although a district court has the power to reject a proposed consent decree,
criteria to be followed in the exercise of that power have never been outlined.
In United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc.,48 the court refused to
approve a proposed decree and ordered the parties to trial, but it expressly
refrained from stating the reasons behind its decision. This single rejection,
like the numerous cases of rubber-stamp approval of consent decrees, 49 offers
no guidance for future action.
Recently two district courts have moved away from this pro forma approval,
at least in large cases where the resulting decree has far-reaching effects.
In United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n50 and United States v. Ling-
Temco-Vought, Inc.,"1 the courts delayed approval of the proposed decree
and ordered public hearings to determine whether the settlement entered into
between the parties were in the public interest. However, in both instances
public interest considerations were limited to objections based on the effects
of the substantive provisions of the consent decree. All objections based on
the adverse effects caused by the entry of the decree (as opposed to pro-
ceeding to trial) were disallowed. 2 This process is an improvement over
rubber-stamp approval, but still presents an overly narrow view of "public
interest." In a hearing concerning the public interest considerations involved
in the approval of a consent decree, the court should consider how such ap-
proval will effect a proper balance of the conflicting purposes of Section
47. SCHWARTZ, DISSENT TO REPORT, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS (1955).
48. 1959 TRADE CAS. 69,300 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
49. See notes 23-24 and accompanying text supra.
50. 307 F. Supp. 617 (C.D. Cal. 1969).
51. 1970 TRADE CAS. 73,156 (W.D. Pa. 1970).
52. It is not clear that any such objections were raised in the Ling-Temco-Vought
case. The reasoning of the court in the Automotive case is revealed in the text ac-
companying note 27, supra.
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5(a).53 To that end, the following questions are pertinent and should be
answered before any consent decree is approved:
(1) Will important issues of law that should be judicially determined re-
main unresolved as a result of the proposed settlement?
(2) Will settlement by consent decree, as a practical matter, impair im-
portant rights of public and private institutions and citizens?
(3) Is the offense alleged of such serious magnitude or of such public
concern so as to warrant the greater deterrent and public educational pur-
poses achieved by a full trial?
(4) Does the proposed decree achieve the same objective as the original
complaint?
Unresolved Issues of Law
Since direct appeal to the Supreme Court is permitted in antitrust cases brought
by the government, 4 the litigated antitrust action provides the Supreme
Court with an opportunity to establish precedent that gives content to the
meaning of antitrust law. Through appellate review, the Supreme Court is
able in litigated cases to preserve the flexibility in the antitrust laws that is
needed to meet changing economic conditions. Settlement by consent de-
cree, on the other hand, provides no meaningful precedent, thereby depriv-
ing business and bar of an opportunity to ascertain whether, in fact, the prac-
tices attacked in the government's complaint are illegal. Neither findings of
fact nor conclusions of law are required to be entered, making reliance upon
language contained in consent decrees uncertain. Similarly, antitrust enforce-
ment officers are deprived of a reliable means by which to judge comparable
activities in other industries.
The recent suit against Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. illustrates these points.
On January 29, 1969, Assistant Attorney General McLaren, in testimony be-
for the Senate Judiciary Committee indicated that he was not convinced that
new legislation was essential to regulate conglomerate mergers under the anti-
trust laws. He felt that Setion 7 of the Clayton Act could be used for that
purpose. 55
The government antitrust suit filed on April 14, 1969, against Ling-Temco-
Vought, Inc.56 was considered an excellent test case for the final resolution
53. See notes 36-37 and accompanying text, supra.
54. 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1964).
55. Testimony of Asst. Attorney General Richard W. McLaren before the Senate
Judiciary Comm. (Jan. 29, 1969), reported in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No.
395 at A-1, A-2.
56. United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., Civil No. 69-438 (W.D. Pa. filed
April 14, 1969); the complaint is reproduced in BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
No. 405 at X-12.
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of this important question. The complaint charged that Ling-Temco-
Vought's acquisition of Jones & Laughlin Steel violated Section 7 of the
Clayton Act by threatening to diminish their potential independent competi-
tion in the steel industry, other metal markets, and diversified industries;
to enhance their power to engage in reciprocal dealing; to increase sub-
stantially the concentration of control of the nation's manufacturing assets;
and to encourage the trend toward further concentration by merger.57 This
first court test of the Justice Department's theories about Section 7, however,
was negated when the action was terminated by court approval of a consent
decree on June 10, 1970.58 Thus, the crucial issue as to the applicability of
Section 7 to conglomerate acquisitions was disposed of without a judicial de-
termination as to its correctness.
Impairment of Important Rights
Because the antitrust laws recognize the rights of persons or groups to initiate
private antitrust actions, 9 the Antitrust Division occupies a position of
trusteeship in administering the laws. Any decision made must take into
some account how the final resolution will affect the rights of public and pri-
vate parties under the antitrust laws. The fear expressed by President
Wilson in 1914 that private persons had neither the resources nor the power
to duplicate government investigative efforts is no less real today. Discovery
in the Automotive case, for example, took the government several years and
several hundred thousand dollars.
To the extent that consent decrees impede the prosecution of private anti-
trust actions by withdrawing government evidence from a trial as complex
and expensive as a treble damage action, such decrees contribute to a sub-
stantial lessening of the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws upon business
operations. Several years ago the House Antitrust Subcommittee summed
up this effect upon antitrust enforcement of the consent decree program:
The almost inevitable consequence of the acceptance of a consent
decree by the Department of Justice, therefore, is to reduce the
effectiveness of section 5 of the Clayton Act and to deprive private
suitors, who have been injured by unlawful conduct, of their statu-
tory remedies under the antitrust laws. 60
Advantages of a Full Trial
The diminished threat of private treble damage suits is one inducement for
57. Id.
58. United States v. Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc., 1970 TRADE CAS. 73,105 (W.D.
Pa. 1970).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
60. REPORT 24.
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antitrust defendants to accept a consent decree. Another is the avoidance of
much of the unfavorable publicity that usually attends antitrust litigation.
Compared to the publicity connected with hard fought antitrust trials, press
coverage of the filing of a proposed consent decree is minimal. The relative
informality and secrecy accompanying consent decree negotiations provide
important incentives for today's image-conscious businessmen.
In terms of the public interest, the natural consequences of these consid-
ations are two-fold. First, the deterrent value of the antitrust laws is
weakened by knowledge that a suspected violator stands only a one in four
chance of being brought to trial."' Business decisions as to whether to pur-
sue questionable conduct can be viewed in terms of calculated risks. As
employment of the consent decree as an antitrust enforcement tool becomes
more widespread, the smaller the chances that such conduct, if challenged
by the government, will subject a company to the unfavorable publicity of a
full trial.
Secondly, the avoidance of a full trial deprives the public of an oppor-
tunity to learn of the nature and depth of the charges brought by the govern-
ment. The American people are the customers of industry and have a right
to know the extent to which their lives may have been affected by question-
able corporate business practices.
Achieving the Objectives of the Complaint
Comparison of the items of relief sought in the government's complaint with
the specific provisions of a proposed consent decree seems to be the basis for
the rejection or approval of proposed decrees by the courts. However, an
adjudication having prima facie effect would appear to constitute an in-
dependent form of relief so that even if a defendant were to consent to all of
the government's other demands for relief, a consent judgment could none-
theless be withheld.
Many of the potential private intervenors in the automobile anti-pollution
case sought to block the proposed consent decree in the hopes of compel-
ling the government to litigate the case to judgment. A final judgment could
then be used as a basis for their own treble damage actions. 62 In the alterna-
tive, they sought the inclusion of an "asphalt clause" which would produce
the same result. 3 The court, however, denied such relief, holding that the
absence of a clause admitting liability was irrelevant to the issue of whether
61. See, e.g., ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST CONSENT DECREE MANUAL at i.
(1968).
62. United States v. Automobile Mfrs. Ass'n, 307 F. Supp. 617, 619-20 (C.D. Cal.
1969).
63. Id. at 620.
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the decree satisfied the public interest.6 4 The argument that inclusion of
such a clause could be justified by the language of the general prayer for re-
lief in the government's complaint was rejected. 65 Most complaints, includ-
ing the one involved in the anti-pollution case contain a prayer requesting
"such other, further and different relief as the nature of the case may re-
quire and the Court may deem just and proper in the premises."6 6 However,
this court stated: "The prayer for such relief as seems proper is a general
catch-all clause, as all attorneys know, and it means little if anything."
'6 7
Nevertheless, in the Ward Baking case, where the complaint also contained
a prayer for general relief, the Supreme Court upheld the government's right
to include items of relief not specifically requested in the complaint but cap-
able of proof at trial in a proposed consent decree:
The disputed provisions certainly may be regarded as within the
general scope of the relief sought in the complaint, which included a
request for "such further, general, and different relief as the nature
of the case may require and the Court may deem appropriate in
the premises.6 8
Therefore, when a court is called upon to consider a proposed consent de-
cree in a case where there are no compelling reasons to require actual trial,
the court should be empowered to reject any consent form of decree that lacks
the prima facie effect which would otherwise provide the opportunity for pri-
vate parties to pursue their remedies. To bar the courts from taking such
action is to hold that a determination of what is best for the public interest
does not involve consideration of potential private treble damage litigants.
Conclusion
The consent decree has become one of the Antitrust Division's most impor-
tant instruments for terminating antitrust cases, and it would be unrealistic
to suggest that its importance will not continue in the future. Yet a strong
danger remains that continued rubber-stamp approval of consent decrees by
the courts will result in the complete abdication of the contemplated judicial
function in favor of an administrative procedure in which there are no rules
to safeguard the interests of the public. Protection of the public interest has
been entrusted to the courts as well as the Justice Department, and it is possi-
ble that they will arrive at conflicting conclusions. For example, in describing
the role of the Justice Department as spokesman for the public in the Cascade
64. Id. at 621.
65. Id., oral opinion (Oct. 28, 1969).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. United States v. Ward Baking Co., 376 U.S. 327, 333 n.3 (1964).
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Natural Gas case,69 the Supreme Court found that the government had
"fallen far short of representing" 70 the intervenors, and that the United States
had "knuckled under to El Paso and 'settled' this litigation." 71
By recommending a more active judicial role in the consent decree pro-
cedure, it is not intended that a court should indulge in second guessing the
Attorney General by resolving the public interest issue in vacuo. The court
should seek to ascertain the circumstances leading to the filing of the pro-
posed decree, and this information should be provided by the government.
Before any decree is acted upon, the courts .should require the government to
file a brief outlining the essential facts involved, the defendant's position, what
the terms of the decree are designed to accomplish, and the advantages to the
public of settlement as opposed to trial. If necessary, a hearing should be held
with an opportunity for interested persons to be heard. Only through such a
zealous protection of the public interest can there be a workable coordination
between consent decrees and private actions in the enforcement of the anti-
trust laws.
Clark E. Walter*
69. Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129 (1967).
70. Id. at 136.
71. Id. at 141.
* The author expresses his appreciation to E. Alex Blanton for his assistance in the
final stages of preparation of this comment.
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